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Abstract: Lesbian couples and single women are choosing to become parents, 
typically via some form of assisted conception, at ever increasing rates. These two 
groups make up approximately thirty per cent of all clients of fertility clinics in 
Canada, and many more conceive at home using the sperm of known donors. Yet, 
when lesbian mothers and single mothers by choice (SMCs) are challenged in the 
courts- usually by a known donor asserting legal parentage and the rights associated 
with it- judges, who often have little statutory guidance, routinely undermine the 
stability and integrity of these women-led families in ways heterosexual couples are 
protected against. In this article, I argue that equality for lesbian and SMC families is 
best achieved via legislative reform that prioritizes intention over biology in the 
assisted reproduction context, akin to the recently introduced legal parentage 
provisions in British Columbia’s Family Law Act. The introduction of legislation of 
this type reduces judicial discretion and provides women-led families with the same 
level of pre-conception certainty heterosexual families have enjoyed for decades. In 
addition, I argue that in circumstances where legislative presumptions are not 
available, or where they fail to resolve the conflict, the best interests of the child test 
should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with children’s section 15 Charter 
equality rights. This will ensure that all children enjoy the same level of family 
stability and security, independent of the composition of their family or their method 
of conception. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Lesbian parents and single mothers by choice (SMCs) have become a permanent, 
and growing, component of Canada’s family mosaic. Yet, the law has been slow to 
respond to these new forms of non-normative family. While women-led families 
have available to them an increasing array of legal mechanisms designed to assist in 
establishing parental ties,1 substantial gaps remain. The most glaring is the absence 
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1 The two most common mechanisms for establishing legal ties between a non-biological lesbian mother 
and her child are second parent adoption and a gender-neutral birth certificate. Second parent adoptions 
permit the non-biological mother to adopt the child without the biological mother losing her parental 
rights. However, the adoption cannot be completed until the child is 6 months old, requires the consent of 
the biological mother (and biological father, if he is known), and requires legal counsel and several 
thousand dollars to complete. Gender-neutral birth certificates permit a non-biological mother to register 
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of comprehensive provincial parentage laws – presumptive laws, typically legislative 
in form, that establish the child’s parentage at birth. Unlike custody or access orders, 
which require an application to the court after the child is born, can be varied by 
subsequent application, and have no force after the child reaches the age of majority, 
legal parentage operates presumptively at birth, does not require a court application, 
cannot be varied, and survives the child reaching the age of majority, thus enabling 
inheritance. Legal parentage therefore provides significantly more long-term stability 
and security than an order for custody or access. Legal parentage also carries 
significant symbolic weight, particularly for non-biological lesbian mothers who 
have historically been denied the status of “parent”, despite actively parenting their 
children from birth.2  
 
 
Only five Canadian provinces – Quebec, Alberta, British Columbia, Prince 
Edward Island and Manitoba – have legal parentage laws applicable in situations of 
assisted conception that include lesbian couples.3 Quebec is the only province that 
explicitly addresses parentage where the sperm donor is known,4 or expressly 
envisages a single woman being a child’s sole legal parent. Several provinces have 
no legislation at all, leaving even heterosexual couples with little legal guidance. 
                                                                                                               
as the child’s “co-parent”. However, the co-parent option is not available when the child was conceived 
with the sperm of a known donor. In addition, birth certificates are only presumptive proof of parentage 
and can be rebutted by someone with a “better” claim (eg, a biological parent). Second parent adoptions 
are available in all Canadian provinces and territories except Prince Edward Island and Nunavut. Re K 
(1995), 15 RFL (4th) 129, (ONCJ); Re A (1999), 181 DLR (4th) 300, (ABQB); Re Nova Scotia (Birth 
Registration No. 1999-02-00420) (2001) ,194 NSR (2d) 362, (NSSC); Adoption Act, CCSM 1997, c. A2, 
s.10; Adoption Act, SNL 1998, c. A-2.1, s.20; Adoption Act, SS 1998, c. A-5.2, s.23; Adoption Act, RSBC 
1996, c. 5 ss.5, 29; Adoption Act, SNWT 1998, c.9, s. 5. Gender neutral birth certificates are available in 
six Canadian provinces and were typically secured via litigation brought by lesbian couples. Gill v 
Murray, 2001 BCHRT 34; A.A. v New Brunswick (Department of Family and Community Services), 
[2004] NBHRBID No. 4; M.D.R v Ontario (Deputy Registrar General), [2006] RFL 6th (25) (ONSC) 
[M.D.R]; Fraess v Alberta (Minister of Justice and Attorney General), 2005 ABQB 889; Vital Statistics 
Act, RSM 1997, c. V60, s. 3(6). 
2 For an overview of the many recent cases, both in Canada and internationally, in which non-biological 
lesbian mothers have been denied legal parentage see Jenni Millbank, “The Limits of Functional Family: 
Lesbian Mother Litigation in the Era of the Eternal Biological Family” (2008) 22 International Journal of 
Law, Policy and the Family 149. For an overview of older decisions see Nancy Polikoff, “The Deliberate 
Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers?”(1996) 
36 Santa Clara Law Review 375 (1996). 
3 Vital Statistics Act, CCSM c V60, s. 3(6); Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1992, c. 64, arts. 538-42; Family 
Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 5.1(1)(a); Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 30 (B.C.’s Family Law Act 
comes into force on 18 March, 2013); Child Status Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-6, ss. 9(5) & 9(6). While Nova 
Scotia’s Vital Statistics Act, RSNS 1989, c 494, makes no mention of same-sex couples or assisted 
reproduction in its birth registration provisions, regulations under the Act permit the mother’s spouse, male 
or female, to register as a legal parent where a child is conceived via “assisted conception”, defined as 
“conception that occurs as a result of artificial reproductive technology, using an anonymous sperm 
donor.” See Birth Registration Regulations, NS Reg 390/2007. 
4 It is estimated that approximately one third of lesbian women and twenty per cent of SMCs conceive 
using the sperm of a known donor. For statistics on lesbian mothers see: Fiona Kelly, Transforming Law’s 
Family: The Legal Recognition of Planned Lesbian Motherhood (Vancouver: UBC Pr, 2011). For 
statistics on SMCs see: http://www.singlemothersbychoice.org/about/faq/ 
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However, the scarcity of legislation in this area poses few issues for opposite-sex 
couples, as they are typically able to rely on traditional presumptions of paternity to 
establish the legal parentage of the mother’s male partner, to the extent his parentage 
is even questioned.5 Lesbian couples and single women have no such luxury. 
 
 
In the absence of legislative guidance judges typically resort to biology, 
rather than the parties’ pre-conception intentions, as the determining factor in 
parentage disputes between lesbian couples or single women and their donors. 
Drawing on traditional family law principles designed for separated opposite-sex 
couples engaged in custody and access disputes, most judges presume that because 
the donor is the child’s biological father he must be a legal parent. Known donors are 
equated with divorcing fathers and, applying the maximum contact rule, which has 
come to dominate Canadian custody and access decision-making,6 the best interests 
of the child is assumed to be met via a relationship with the “other parent” – the 
biological “father” – rather than through the preservation of the existing parental and 
family relationships. Lesbian couples and SMCs are even accused of acting 
“selfishly” for wanting to protect the boundaries of their family and, in the case of a 
lesbian couple, the integrity of the non-biological mother’s role as a parent. As a 
result of the judicial preference for biology over pre-conception intention, known 
donors who have sought legal parentage and access rights to children being raised by 
lesbian couples or SMCs are frequently successful, with judges concluding the donor 
is a legal father and the child’s best interests are served via regular access. 7 
 
 
                                                
5 Presumptions of paternity are included in all provincial family law statutes. Family Relations Act, RSBC 
1996, c 128, s 95; Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO, 1990, c 12, s 8; Child, Youth and Family 
Enhancement Act, RSA, 2000, c C-12, s 1(1)(a); Family Law Act, SA, 2003, c F-45, s 1(f), s 8(1); Family 
Maintenance Act, CCSM, c F20, s 23; Family Services Act, SNB, 1980, c F2.2, s 103; Children’s Law Act, 
RSNL, 1990, c C-13, ss 7 & 10; Children’s Law Act, SNWT, 1997, c14, s 8; Maintenance and Custody 
Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, s 2(j); Child and Family Services Act, RSNS, 1990 c 5, s 3(1)(r)(vii); Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-33, s 3(1); Child Status Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-6, s 
9(1); Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64, art 525; Children’s Law Act, SS 2002, c C-8.1, s 45; 
Children’s Act, RSYT, 2002, c 31, s 12. 
6 In the absence of any other guiding criteria in the Divorce Act, the “maximum contact rule” (s 16(10)) 
plays an extremely influential role in custody and access decision-making. Though the rule is tempered by 
the child’s best interests – that is, maximum contact is the goal, but only when consistent with a child’s 
best interests – in practice, the child’s best interests have become so intertwined with maintaining a 
relationship with both parents that the section is often interpreted as indicating that maximum contact is 
always in a child’s best interests. Indeed, trial judges frequently state that there is a “presumption” that 
“regular access” is in a child’s best interests and that access can only be denied in the event of proof of 
harm. Young v Young, [1993] 4 SCR 3 at para 204; V.S.J. v L.J.G. (2004), 5 RFL (6th) 319 (ONSC) at 
para 128; Elwan v Al-Taher (2009), 69 RFL (6th) 199 (ONSC) at para 76; M.I. v M.W., [2011] OJ No 
1685 (QL) (ONSC) at para 102; Norman v Penney (2010), 305 Nfl d & PEIR 241 (NLSCTD) at para 22; 
Matos v Driesman (2009), 86 WCB (2d) 27 (ONSC) at para 39.	  
7 Most of the cases discussed below reflect this general trend. For a discussion of such cases from a variety 
of common law jurisdiction see Millbank, supra note 2. 
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As Angela Campbell has argued, judicial prioritization of biology over pre-
conception intention is odd given that assisted conception necessarily de-centres 
biological connection: 
 
In circumstances involving assisted reproduction, identifying biology as a 
basis for [parentage] seems perplexing, given that the point of using 
reproductive materials or services from third parties is to acquire parental 
status even where one cannot rely (or chooses not to rely) on 
biological/‘natural’ methods of procreation. Thus, locating parenthood 
should command more than tracing a child’s genetic heritage.8 
 
 
 What is perhaps at the heart of the judicial inclination to turn to biology, 
despite the use of assisted conception, is the perception that a woman-led family is 
incomplete. Thus, rather than focusing on the fact that children of lesbian couples 
and SMCs are being raised in stable, intact, (sometimes married) families, judges 
reconfigure lesbian and SMC families into heterosexual ones in which the biological 
parents have separated. The result is that lesbian and SMC families are denied the 
legal security typically afforded to intact heterosexual families who use assisted 
reproduction. Third parties, in the guise of “parents,” are inserted into women-led 
families, diminishing the relationship between the child and his or her non-biological 
mother, and often providing the non-biological mother with no legal status at all. 
 
 
In this article, I argue that lesbians and single women should be able to 
create families of their choice and, in the event of legal challenge, have a reasonable 
expectation that the courts will preserve the integrity of their family unit. To enable 
this, legislative reform prioritizing intention over biology in the assisted reproduction 
context, as it already does when the couple conceiving is heterosexual, is needed in 
every Canadian province. In addition to legislative reform, and especially in its 
absence, the article also argues that children’s best interests are served by ensuring 
that all children enjoy the same level of family stability and security, independent of 
their family structure and/or method of conception. Many legal battles between 
lesbian couples and their donors involve not only parentage claims, but also disputes 
over access which turn on what is in the best interests of child. In order to prevent 
discrimination on the basis of method of conception and/or the structure of the 
family into which the child is born, the best interests test must be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with children’s section 15 equality rights under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.9 Most importantly, a child conceived via assisted 
conception and born into a woman-led family should have no less a right to a secure 
and stable family life than a child similarly conceived and born to heterosexual 
parents. 
                                                
8 Angela Campbell, “Conceiving Parents Through Law” (2007) 21(2) International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 242 at 259. 
9 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 15. 
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The article begins with an overview and critique of Canadian legal parentage 
disputes between lesbian or single women and their known sperm donors. It 
highlights the ways in which the current legal framework, which in most provinces 
includes an absence of modern parentage laws, results in judges applying a 
traditional and outdated mode of analysis in a manner that undermines the autonomy 
and integrity of women-led families. Recognizing that law reform in this area must 
be multi-pronged, the remainder of the article considers provincial statutory reform, 
as well as recommendations as to how judges might interpret the best interests of the 
child test in a manner that protects the stability and security of all Canadian children, 
not just those born into traditional heterosexual families. 
 
 
1. THE EXISTING CASE LAW: A TRIUMPH OF BIOLOGY 
 
Like most jurisdictions, Canada now has a small number of cases involving lesbian 
couples and SMCs that expressly address parentage in situations of assisted 
conception where the sperm provider is known. Despite the low numbers, clear 
trends have emerged. Known donors have been declared parents in all but two 
applications, and judges have uniformly expressed the belief that it is in a child’s 
best interest to have access with his or her biological father, independent of the 
circumstances of conception or structure of the child’s family. Judges have been 
dismissive of any suggestion that the imposition of a donor on an intact family may 
be damaging to the parent(s) or child. Scholars from other common law jurisdictions 
have demonstrated that these trends are by no means unique to Canada.10 Nor should 
they be understood as separate from Canadian family law trends more generally. 
Finding fathers for children raised by lesbian couples or SMCs is part of a much 
larger trend towards prioritizing and maximizing father/child contact, even in 
circumstances where the father has a limited, or even quite negative,11 relationship 
with the child.12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Millbank, supra note 2; Therese Callus, “A New Parenthood Paradigm for Twenty-First Century Family 
Law in England and Wales?” (2012) 32 Legal Studies 347. 
11 Fiona Kelly, “Enforcing a Parent/Child Relationship At All Cost? Supervised Access Orders in the 
Canadian Courts” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 6. 
12 Susan Boyd, “Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties, Intentionality and Responsibility" (2007) 
25 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 55; Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal 
Fatherhood in Maintaining the Traditional Family” (2009) 21 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 
315. 
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LESBIAN MOTHERS AND KNOWN DONORS: THE CASE LAW 
 
Three of the Canadian cases between lesbian couples and their donors originate from 
Quebec, one of the few Canadian provinces in which the relationship between 
assisted reproduction and “filiation”, the civil law equivalent of legal parentage,13 is 
directly addressed by legislation which includes lesbian couples within its 
parameters.14 The decisions may therefore not be particularly representative of how 
disputes would be resolved in provinces where no such legislation exists. However, 
the partial successes found in the Quebec cases demonstrate the potential importance 
of legislative reform. By explicitly defining the rules of parentage in cases of assisted 
reproduction, the Quebec Civil Code limits the discretion available to judges to 
reformulate a lesbian family into one in which a father exists.  
 
 
The first of the Quebec the cases, S.G. v. L.C., dealt with the status of a 
known sperm donor to a lesbian couple via an interim access application filed by the 
donor.15 The decision was based largely on information contained within the donor’s 
unopposed affidavit and was never appealed. The child in S.G. was conceived via 
donor insemination and was raised by her lesbian mothers. The two women, who had 
undergone a civil union ceremony a month before the child was born, were listed on 
the child’s birth certificate as her parents. While the mothers initially allowed some 
contact between the donor (S.G.) and the child, when they began to limit contact, 
S.G. sought an order of filiation (parentage). He argued a “parental project,” as 
defined by article 538 of Quebec’s Civil Code, existed between himself and the 
biological mother (L.C.). He also argued it had always been his and the biological 
mother’s intention that the two of them raise the child as mother and father. S.G. 
supported his claim with an affidavit in which he asserted that the non-biological 
mother had initially opposed the biological mother’s decision to have a child and had 
suggested that she might end the relationship if the biological mother went ahead 
                                                
13 While the civil law concept of “filiation” and the common law concept of “legal parentage” are often 
equated, they are not identical. As Leckey explains, in relation to the Quebec provisions, filiation is a 
much more expansive notion than legal parentage: “Filiation is said to be the fundamental element of 
family belonging, a foundation of the social order. The common law tradition, while ascribing rights and 
duties to parentage, has not theorized the parent-child relationship comparably.” Filiation is also 
characterized as “an institution” and thus less open than legal parentage to amendment. As Leckey 
explains, “An institution is said not to be founded by contract, and its members precluded from altering its 
essential terms. The legislature is said to recognize institutions, not to create them.” Filiation might 
therefore be understood as more resistant to change than legal parentage. Thus while Quebec is one of the 
few provinces that provides legislative recognition of women-led families, the nature of filiation has 
created interpretive nuances that are perhaps unique to a civil law system. As Leckey concludes, “The 
notion of filiation as institution, which connotes some immunity or at least resistance to change, jostles 
uneasily with the extent to which the legislature has, in recent decades, changed its recognition of that 
institution.” Robert Leckey, “‘Where the Parents are of the Same-Sex’: Quebec’s Reforms to Filiation” 
(2009) 23 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 62 at 64. 
14 Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64, arts 538-42. For an overview of the Quebec provisions, see 
Leckey, ibid. 
15 S.G. v L.C, [2004] RJQ 1685 (QCCS) [SG]. Unfortunately, a media publication ban was put on the case, 
making it difficult to know much about the dispute other than what is included in the interim judgment: 
S.G. c. L.C., [2005] JQ No 7407 (QL). 
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with the plan.16 Though the non-biological mother did not end the relationship, and 
in fact went on to co-parent the child and enter into a civil union with the biological 
mother, the court relied on S.G.’s assertions to suggest the non-biological mother 
was not a party to the parental project.  
 
 
As noted above, Quebec has some of the most inclusive laws in Canada 
available to lesbian parents. Under the filiation provisions in the Civil Code, if a 
child is born of a “parental project” involving assisted conception, it is presumed the 
spouse, whether male or female, of the woman who gave birth to the child is the 
child’s other parent.17 A “parental project” exists “from the moment a person alone 
decides, or spouses by mutual consent decide, in order to have a child, to resort to the 
genetic material of a person who is not party to the parental project.”18 In the case of 
lesbian mothers, the parental project is typically between the members of the lesbian 
couple and not between the birth mother and the donor. To give effect to this reality, 
article 538.2 states that the contribution of genetic material does not create any 
automatic bond of filiation between the contributor and the child.19 Rather, a sperm 
donor can only have a bond of filiation if he is a party to the parental project.  
 
 
In making her decision in S.G., Courteau J relied heavily on the donor’s 
version of events, concluding that the parental project was between S.G. and L.C., 
not between L.C. and her spouse.20 Unfortunately, the evidence around the parties’ 
decision-making process was not particularly clear and, given the absence of an 
affidavit from S.G. and L.C., the judge had little alternative but to accept the donor’s 
version of events. However, in the course of her judgment, Courteau J unnecessarily 
attacked the mothers’ desire to create a women-led family. She held that the mothers’ 
attitude to access was “totally destructive” and that they were denying their child her 
“rights to her father.”21 Viewing the lesbian family as inherently incomplete, 
Courteau J treated the imposition of a third party on the lesbian family as positive 
rather than destructive, ignoring the challenge it posed to the integrity of the unit the 
two women had created. Justice Courteau also accused the non-biological mother of 
having created her parental relationship with the child “artificially,” particularly with 
regard to her appearing on the child’s birth certificate.22 It is difficult to know exactly 
what Courteau J is asserting with this statement, given that the non-biological mother 
                                                
16 The two mothers did not file affidavits, so their version of events is unknown. 
17 Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64, art 538.3. 
18 Ibid art 538. 
19 Ibid art 538.2. 
20 SG, supra note 15 at para 34. 
21 Ibid at para 54. 
22 Ibid at para 50. 
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parented the child from birth, the donor never indicated a desire to be on the birth 
certificate, and the Civil Code expressly permits the creation of filiation by such 
“artificial” means. 
 
 
The second Quebec case was L.O. v. S.J.23 Due to the clarity of the factual 
evidence in L.O., the court had little choice but to follow the clear instruction of the 
filiation provisions in the Civil Code. The parties had a donor agreement specifying 
that the donor agreed to relinquish all rights he may have as a legal parent. The court 
relied on the agreement as written confirmation of the intention of the parties with 
regard to the “parental project.” In addition, the court relied on the fact the women 
already had two children conceived using the sperm of a different donor to support 
the assertion that the donor was not intended to be part of the family. Based on these 
facts, the court held that the parties to the parental project were the two women and 
that the donor was a third-party gamete provider. The donor asserted that the parental 
project involved three individuals – he and the two mothers – but the court rejected 
the claim on the basis that Quebec law did not permit three legal parents. The donor 
was thus excluded from the status of father. The unusual result in L.O. – a victory for 
the lesbian couple – points to the potential advantage of statutory rules, at least 
where the facts indicate a clear intention on the part of the two women to form a 
parental project. 
 
 
The third decision from Quebec is A v. B, C and X. Like L.O., it 
demonstrates the potentially positive impact of the Quebec legislation where the 
intentions are fairly clear.24 As with the other Quebec cases, the lesbian couple in A 
v. B, C and X conceived using the sperm of a known donor. Following the birth, the 
non-biological mother began the process of adopting the child. That process was 
stalled when the donor sought a declaration of filiation, increased access, and access 
alone with his other family members. The Quebec Court of Appeal refused to 
recognize the filiation of the donor on the basis that conception occurred via donor 
insemination and the donor had signed an agreement, explicitly relinquishing any 
rights or responsibilities he might have in relation to a child conceived via his 
donation.25 While the donor had enjoyed some access with the child, it was 
insufficient to override the very clear agreement between the parties. The Court of 
Appeal also noted that while Ontario recognizes the possibility of a child having 
three parents, such a finding was not available under Quebec law, and the court 
therefore was not in a position to add the donor as a third parent.26  
 
 
                                                
23 L.O. v S.J., 2006 QCSC 302. 
24 A v B, C and X, 2007 QCCA 361. 
25 Ibid at paras 51- 55 
26 Ibid at para 55. 
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Outside of Quebec there have been only two cases addressing the legal 
status of known donors. The first, M.A.C. v. M.K., arose in Ontario where there is no 
legislative regime addressing parentage in such situations.27 Unlike any of the 
previous decisions, the parties in M.A.C. had a three-way co-parenting agreement 
entered into prior to the child’s conception. During the early years of the child’s life 
the donor played a fairly active role, both in terms of caregiving and decision-
making. However, when the parties had a falling out, the mothers asserted that their 
nuclear family should be protected against the now unwanted intrusion of their 
known donor. They applied for a second-parent adoption and requested the court 
dispense with the donor’s consent.28 Their application was rejected on the basis that 
the parties had agreed the donor would be involved in the child’s life and that he had 
in fact been involved. Given his active role in the family, the court was unwilling to 
dispense with the donor’s consent. While the court upheld the original intention of 
the parties to include the donor in the child’s life, the effect of the decision was the 
relegation of the non-biological mother (who had parented the child from birth) to 
the status of legal stranger, while the biologically related donor (who played a 
significantly smaller role in the child’s life) was elevated to the status of parent. 
Thus, while the intentions of the parties were given weight, the law’s prioritization of 
biology over social relationships meant that the decision’s effect on the two mothers, 
particularly the non-biological mother, was devastating.   
 
 
While the result in M.A.C. is likely to be understood as a defeat for lesbian 
parenthood, it is possible that in situations where the child and donor have a 
relationship and it was the pre-conception intention that they do, it might be in the 
child’s best interest to maintain that relationship, albeit in a way that does not 
undermine the primary parents. However, the law treats the issue as an either/or 
determination: the donor is either a parent or he is not, leaving no room for the 
avuncular role that some sperm donors to lesbian families play.29 While providing 
some legal recognition for “involved known donors”30 should be considered 
cautiously, in light of what appears to be a strong desire on the part of many judges 
to “find fathers” for the children of lesbian mothers, having the middle-ground 
option available may defuse situations that give rise to cases such as M.A.C. 
                                                
27 M.A.C. v M.K., 2009 ONCJ 18. 
28 The donor had already successfully applied for access: K.(M.) v. C.(M.) and D.(C.), 2007 ONCJ 456. 
29 In empirical research with lesbian mothers living in British Columbia and Alberta, I have found that in 
approximately half of the families interviewed who conceived using the sperm of known donors included 
the donor in the child’s life. Amongst the women interviewed, whether they conceived with a known 
donor or not, I identified fairly strong support for a legal category designed to capture the relationship of 
an “involved known donor”. I  referred to the relationship as that of a “non-parental adult caregiver” and 
argued that it captured the role of an involved known donor, while clarifying that such an individual is not 
a legal parent. Kelly, supra note 4 at 155 
30 Such a proposal was first suggested by Fred Bernstein, “This Child Does Have Two Mothers…And an 
Involved Known Donor” (1996) 22 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 1. 
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Extending some form of legal recognition to involved donors protects the donor’s 
interest in maintaining an access relationship with the child, while also protecting the 
lesbian family, particularly the non-biological mother. When the “involved known 
donor” and non-biological mother need no longer compete for the status of second 
legal parent the likelihood, as well as the intensity, of a dispute may be lessened. 
 
 
The only jurisdiction to have adopted such an approach is New Zealand. 
Section 41 of New Zealand’s Care of Children Act31 acknowledges that in some 
families known donors play a significant, albeit non-parental, role in their child’s 
life. It thus allows for a known donor, in a discrete set of circumstances, to opt into 
the family as a non-parental figure with the consent of the child’s presumptive 
parents. It does so through the recognition of written parenting agreements. Section 
41 expressly sanctions pre-conception agreements addressing the role of a known 
donor in a child’s life, including the amount of contact the donor will have with the 
child.32 The agreement itself cannot be enforced under the Act, but a court may, with 
the agreement of the parties, make a consent order that embodies some or all of the 
terms of the agreement.33 That order, insofar as it relates to contact with the child, 
can be enforced under the Act as if it were a parenting order for contact.34 
Importantly, neither an agreement nor an order affects the donor’s legal status with 
respect to the child. Neither enables him to become a legal parent or guardian. 
Although the terms of the agreement can be varied and the best interests of the child 
will always prevail, section 41 permits lesbian women and their donors to carve out a 
non-parental role for the donor prior to conception that will, in most cases, be 
respected by the courts. 
 
 
Another Ontario case addressing lesbian mothering in the context of known 
donors is A.A. v B.B., a Court of Appeal decision in which it was held that a child 
could have three legal parents – his two mothers and his donor father.35 The parties 
in A.A. v B.B. were not in conflict. All agreed the child had three parents, yet only the 
biological mother and the donor were listed on the child’s birth certificate. The 
parties challenged the assumption that a child can only have two legal parents and 
requested that the non-biological mother be added to the birth certificate without 
having to remove the donor. The application was ultimately successful, with the 
court using its parens patriae power to declare that the child had three legal parents. 
While A.A. v B.B. is the only decision of its kind and is heavily dependent on the 
individual facts of the case, it does suggest that in families in which three adults 
agree they are all parents, the courts may be willing to give legal recognition to the 
                                                
31 Care of Children Act (NZ). 
32 Ibid, s. 41(2). 
33 Ibid s 41(3). 
34 Ibid s 41(4) 
35 A.A. v B.B, 2007 ONCA 2 [A.A.]. 
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arrangement. Interestingly, British Columbia’s new Family Law Act provides a 
legislative mechanism by which to achieve this same result.36 
 
 
While A.A. is in some ways a groundbreaking decision, the manner in which 
the parties had to construct their case demonstrates the ongoing prioritization of 
biology. In A.A. it was the non-biological mother and not the donor, who had to 
apply to be added as the child’s third parent, the donor having been listed on the 
child’s birth certificate. The choice to include the donor on the birth certificate may 
seem odd given the child was being raised primarily by his two mothers, with the 
donor having fairly limited contact and not taking part in any of the day-to-day 
decision-making. However, the parties had no other option. While two women were 
permitted to appear on a child’s birth certificate in Ontario at the time of the child’s 
birth, the case granting that right, M.D.R. v Ontario, limited the new birth 
certificate’s availability to women who conceived with the sperm of an anonymous 
donor.37 The limiting of M.D.R. to situations of anonymous sperm donors appears to 
suggest that when a biological father is known and available, courts are reluctant to 
sever his rights. The impact of the M.D.R. decision on the parties in A.A. was that the 
non-biological mother – one of the child’s two primary caregivers – was placed in 
the situation of having to assert her parental status, while the donor, who played only 
a limited role in the child life, was deemed a legal parent at birth. 
 
 
The final Canadian case involving a dispute between a lesbian couple and a 
known donor is still unfolding, with a trial expected in mid 2013.38 The dispute is 
between a married lesbian couple, X.X. and Y.Y., who have been together for over 
15 years, and W.W., their sperm donor. X.X., the biological mother, had attended 
elementary school with W.W. When she and Y.Y. decided to have a baby, she 
approached W.W., the only gay man in town, to ask whether he would be their sperm 
donor. X.X. offered to pay W.W. for his services, but he declined. W.W. requested 
his name be put on the birth certificate, but X.X. explained that her wife Y.Y. would 
be named as the child’s second parent. A week after the initial conversation, they 
signed an agreement. It stated: 
 
I, W.W., hereby sign over any and all parental rights to any children 
created by using my donated semen. I understand that by signing my rights 
over I will have absolutely no rights, from this day forward, to see, visit, 
claim, or request custody of any children resulting from use of my sperm. 
By signing this agreement I understand that my semen will be used to 
inseminate X.X., which will potentially result in children being conceived. 
As well as not having any rights to any children born of my donated 
                                                
36 Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 30. 
37 M.D.R., supra note 1. 
38 DeBlois v Lavigne, 2012 ONSC 3949. 
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semen, I will not be responsible at any time to pay support of any kind of 
all children conceived by using my semen. I further agree that at no time 
will I interact with the children without the consent of the mother. Also I 
will not tell any children, that I believe to be conceived with my semen, 
that I am their biological father. I agree that I will not interfere with the 
raising of children. This agreement is a legally binding contract and cannot 
be changed or revoked without the consent and agreement of the mother as 
well as the adoptive parent, if any. 
 
 
 Over the next 16 months W.W. provided semen samples 1-5 times a month. 
X.X. conceived in January 2010. After X.X. informed W.W. that she was pregnant 
they had no further contact. A boy (Z.Z.) was born in October 2010, and has been 
raised solely by his two mothers. He has never met W.W. In January 2011, W.W. 
served X.X. with an application seeking a declaration of parentage, to have his name 
added to the birth certificate, access to Z.Z., and a restraining/non-harassment order 
against X.X. The access schedule proposed by W.W. began with two hour access 
visits every second weekend in April 2011 and rapidly proceeded to entire weekends 
of access by December 2011. In addition, W.W. requested rotating holiday access, 
and half of school holidays once Z.Z. began school.  
 
 
W.W. conceded he had signed the agreement, but argued he did so under 
duress. He claimed that when he and X.X. attended school together she bullied him, 
and that this past bullying intimidated him and placed him in a disadvantaged 
bargaining position. W.W. argued the agreement should therefore be declared void. 
X.X. denied W.W.’s allegations and noted he had had ample time to withdraw from 
the arrangement prior to Z.Z.’s conception. In April 2012, the parties participated in 
a settlement conference, presided over by Cornell J. The result of the conference was 
a consent order,39 endorsed by Cornell J, setting aside the donor agreement for lack 
of consideration40 and permitting access. The only remaining issue for trial, 
according to Cornell J, was what was in the best interest of Z.Z. Following the 
consent order W.W. brought an application for interim access.  
 
 
In June 2012, X.X. and Y.Y. obtained new counsel and successfully sought 
to have the interim access order set aside. Karam J, the presiding judge, held that 
                                                
39 This consent order is not available. However, details of the order are included in a subsequent challenge 
to it: W.W. v X.X. and Y.Y., 2013 ONSC 879.  
40 While this might appear to be a logical conclusion under contract law, in the family law context it is 
rather unusual. First, historically courts have refused to recognize the validity of contracts related to 
children on the basis that they are contrary to public policy. The fear is that a contract will usurp the 
child’s best interests, the sole criterion upon which parenting decisions should be based. Thus, to suggest 
that the agreement is invalid on the basis of a lack of consideration is an unusual choice given the existing 
jurisprudence. Second, if consideration had taken the form of financial compensation, which is what 
Cornell J. seems to imply, the parties would have been engaging in illegal activity, given that section 7(1) 
of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, prohibits the buying and selling of human 
gametes. 
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making an order for access in the particular circumstances of the case was 
problematic. First, he was concerned that with the trial just months away, an order 
for access would inevitably influence the outcome of the proceedings. Second, he 
was concerned about the negative implications for Z.Z. As he explained “despite the 
child’s young age, it is impossible to know what disclosure of the applicant’s status 
as his parent might mean. All circumstances considered, the risk of there being an 
adverse affect to the child is too great to ignore.”41 This statement is one of the few 
in cases such as this where a child’s interest in maintaining a stable family life is 
given some weight. At the same time, Karam J referred throughout the judgment to 
W.W. as Z.Z.’s “father” and “parent”, most notably while discussing what he 
understood to be a presumption in favour of contact with “both parents”.42 
 
 
The disagreement between X.X., Y.Y. and W.W. is emblematic of the types of 
disputes that occur between lesbian couples and their donors, but in no other 
Canadian case have the intentions of the parties been so clearly articulated in 
writing.43 There is no evidence whatsoever that X.X. and Y.Y. intended to share 
parenting with W.W., and no evidence that W.W. wanted to be a parent beyond an 
initial request to appear on the birth certificate. What happens in X.X. & Y.Y. v W.W. 
will, in many ways, test the willingness of judges to permit women to create families 
of their own.  
 
 
SINGLE MOTHERS BY CHOICE AND KNOWN DONORS 
 
On the whole, SMCs fare worse than lesbian mothers when challenged by known 
donors, in large part because they have no second parent to fill the “gap” created by 
not having a father. While all of the cases have complex facts, many of which are in 
dispute, the judges deciding them have demonstrated little tolerance for the kind of 
autonomous motherhood SMCs envisage. The first Canadian case that might be 
described as involving an SMC was Johnson-Steeves v Lee,44 an access dispute 
between the mother and the man she characterized as a sperm donor. Caroline 
Johnson-Steeves asked King Tak Lee, an old friend, whether he would be a sperm 
donor. She alleged that the parties made an oral agreement that Lee would either 
donate sperm or father the child via intercourse and provide some financial support, 
but that he would not interfere with decision-making around the health and welfare 
of the child.  
                                                
41 DeBlois v Lavigne, 2012 ONSC 3949 at para 12. 
42 Ibid at paras 8-9. 
43 In most of the cases to date, parties have not entered into written agreements or have prepared 
agreements that do not clearly state their intentions with regard to donor access. 
44 Johnson-Steeves v Lee [1997] 6 WWR 608 (ABQB) [Lee]; Johnson-Steeves v Lee (1997), 209 AR 202 
(ABCA) [Lee appeal]. 
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Lee did not contest that he had agreed to provide financial support or that he 
would not play a decision-making role in the child’s life. However, he submitted the 
parties specifically discussed his desire to see the child and Johnson-Steeves had 
stated “of course he could see the child and that she would never deny kids the right 
to see their dad.”45 It was Johnson-Steeves’ assertion, however, that the parties did 
not discuss access, but that she had told Lee he could see the child whenever he 
passed through town. The child (Nigel) was conceived via intercourse. Lee was not 
listed on the birth certificate, but was acknowledged as Nigel’s father for the purpose 
of providing maintenance. Lee visited with Nigel several times over the first ten 
months of life. However, following a series of disagreements, Johnson-Steeves 
prevented Lee from exercising access. The case was initiated by Lee seeking an 
access order. At the time of trial, Nigel was four and half years old.  
 
 
In support of her request that access be denied, Johnson-Steeves argued the 
court must distinguish between a biological father who is not entitled to access as of 
right and a social father who has access rights.46 She submitted that Lee had agreed 
he would not be a social father and was thus not entitled to access. Johnson-Steeves 
also submitted that Nigel’s family was complete without a father and to suggest 
otherwise would “violate Nigel’s understanding of his family unit”47 and force “on 
her a family structure that she did not choose.”48  
 
 
From the outset the trial judge and the Court of Appeal rejected Johnson-
Steeves’ construction of her family. Kenny J began by stating Nigel was “conceived 
under circumstances that many would consider unusual and perhaps distasteful”,49 
suggesting that she was somewhat uncomfortable with the idea of deliberately 
creating a single mother family.  Kenny J then disputed Johnson-Steeves’ suggestion 
Lee was a “sperm donor” and thus “just a biological father.” Accusing her of 
thinking only of herself and mirroring comments made by judges in cases involving 
lesbian mothers, Kenny J stated that she found this construction of Lee’s identity 
“totally selfish”.50  
 
                                                
45 Lee, supra note 44 at para 21. 
46 Ibid at para 46. Johnson-Steeves’ assertion, which the court accepted, was that genetic parents do not 
have automatic access rights to their children. Rather, access decisions must be made in the best interests 
of the child. The court did not accept the mother’s argument that a social parent has a right of access. 
Rather, the court concluded that social parents, like biological parents, are entitled to access only if it is in 
the child’s best interests. 
47 Ibid at para 52.  
48 Ibid at para 48.  
49 Ibid at para. 52. 
50 Ibid at para. 49.  
[2013] EQUAL PARENTS, EQUAL CHILDREN  
 
 
 
267 
 
After concluding Lee was not a sperm donor, Kenny J addressed Johnson-
Steeves’ assertion that Nigel’s family was complete without a father. Kenny J’s 
conclusions with regard to this issue, cited with approval by the Court of Appeal,51 
drew heavily on the evidence of Dr. Kneier, a child psychologist who had not met 
either of the parties or Nigel. Kenny J cited with approval Dr. Kneier’s assertion 
“that fathers are good for children” and that “although children can, and often do, 
achieve a healthy development without a father…it is better to have a relationship 
with their father than not to have one.”52 She also relied on Dr. Kneier’s assertion 
that a “good relationship by a boy with his father helps develop intelligence and 
drive, improves academic achievement and helps introduce independence, empathy 
and social adequacy with peers.”53 In light of Dr. Kneier’s evidence, Kenny J 
concluded that Nigel, no matter what the circumstances of his conception, had a right 
of access to his father54 and that Lee would contribute to Nigel’s life as “only a father 
could do”.55  
 
 
While the factual circumstances in Johnson-Steeves do not lend themselves 
to drawing clear conclusions as to the law’s treatment of SMCs a number of insights 
can be gleaned. First, Johnson-Steeves supports – as other more traditional custody 
and access decisions have – a renewed emphasis on biological fatherhood as an 
essentialized identity, assumed to provide several defined benefits to children, 
particularly boys. 56 These benefits are perceived as outweighing the integrity of the 
SMC-created family and the child’s need for a stable family life. A second point to 
be taken from Johnson-Steeves is that the circumstances of conception appear 
irrelevant to a determination of parentage. Though Nigel was conceived via 
intercourse, Kenny J states that it did not matter whether the child was conceived by 
artificial insemination, a one night stand, or during a long term relationship, he had a 
mother and a father.57 This is a troubling conclusion given that the use of assisted 
conception is, in the context of heterosexual couples, presumed to sever any legal 
link between the child and the gamete provider.  
 
 
                                                
51 Lee appeal, supra note 44 at paras. 17-18. 
52 Lee, supra note 44 at para 40. 
53 Ibid at para 41. 
54 Ibid at para 54. 
55 Ibid at para 56. 
56 For a discussion of the increasing judicial emphasis on essentialized biological fatherhood see Kelly, 
supra note 12 at 329-40. 
57 Lee, supra note 44 at para 54. 
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A 2007 decision of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, Caufield v Wong, 
further demonstrates the judicial reluctance to validate a woman’s decision to 
actively choose to become a single mother.58 Catherine Caufield and Allan Wong 
had a short non-cohabiting intimate relationship. When it ended, Wong agreed “as an 
act of friendship” to provide sperm to allow Caufield to attempt in vitro fertilization 
(IVF). 59 Caufield conceived a set of twins. Wong immediately sought to be involved 
in the children’s lives, even following Caufield when she moved to Edmonton soon 
after the children’s birth. Caufield was willing to accept some access – the 2007 
application by Caufield was to reduce Wong’s access granted by Trussler J in 2003– 
but insisted that she never intended him to be a parent and that her children did not 
need a father. By contrast, Wong asserted he was a legal parent and entitled to equal 
parenting time. Despite the extremely high level of conflict between the parties, the 
Court ultimately made an order for shared parenting.60 
 
 
As in Johnson-Steeves, Sanderman J refused to entertain the idea that Wong 
was anything but a parent. Unlike Johnson-Steeves, conception in Caufield was 
achieved via IVF, a highly technical process involving significant medical 
intervention. At the time of the initial trial, Alberta lacked any legislative guidance 
with regard to parentage where assisted conception is used. However, in her 2007 
application to reduce Wong’s access, Caufield directed the court to section 13(3) of 
Alberta’s Family Law Act, introduced just months after the 2003 decision, which 
states: 
 
[A] male person whose sperm is used in an assisted conception involving 
an egg of a female person who is neither his spouse nor a person with 
whom he is a relationship of interdependence of some permanence is not 
the father of the resulting child and acquires no parental or guardianship 
rights or responsibilities of any kind as a result of the use of his sperm.61 
 
Caufield argued section 13(3) supported her assertion that Wong did not acquire 
parental rights or responsibilities by virtue of his donation. As Sanderman J himself 
notes, Wong had never been the spouse of Caufield, they had never lived in a 
relationship of interdependence of some permanence, and the children were born via 
assisted conception. However, the judge declared Wong was “still the father of these 
children.”62 Justice Sanderman’s reasoning was that because the 2003 interim order 
established Wong was a father and granted him joint custody of the children, and 
since all of this preceded the legislative amendment, section 13(3) was not applicable 
                                                
58 Caufield v Wong, 2007 ABQB 732 [Caufield]. The 2007 judgment is not the first with regard to the 
parties. By 2007, they had appeared before Alberta courts three times to resolve their access issues, as well 
as to determine the fate of four fertilized embryos that remained in storage.  
59 C.C. v A.W, 2005 ABQB 290 at para. 2 [CC]. 
60 Wong was granted 11 days in a row of parenting time per month. For each of July and August, the 
children were with him for two uninterrupted weeks.  
61 Family Law Act, RSA 2003, Ch F-4.5, s 13(3). 
62 Caufield, supra note 58 at para 33. 
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and the matter was closed. Sanderman J’s decision was not altogether surprising. The 
children had, by 2007, established a relationship with Wong and it was unlikely in 
their best interests to sever it. The appropriateness of Trussler J’s initial decision is, 
however, worthy of discussion. 
 
 
A second attack on single mothering by choice in Caufield is found in 
Sanderman J’s extensive analysis, in both decisions, of Caufield’s approach to 
parenting. It is difficult to read Sanderson J.’s commentary as anything other than a 
warning that if mothers are left to parent alone they will ‘smother’ their children.63 
As Sanderman J argues, while Caufield’s efforts may be “well-intentioned,” her 
attachment style of parenting has deteriorated into a form of “smothering care” 
characterized by “over protective controlling behavior that is not in [the children’s] 
best interests.”64 She is criticized for “wanting to be the central figure in all aspects 
of [her children’s] lives”65 and for “needing to maintain close contact with the 
children even when they are in the care of their father.”66 These attacks on Caufield 
draw on the trope of the ‘smothering mother:’ over-protective, controlling and 
ultimately damaging, especially to boys. The involvement of the children’s father, 
described in this case as ‘traditional’ and ‘rigid’, is therefore needed to balance the 
effects of the mother’s over-nurturing of her children.67 While Caufield’s attachment 
parenting style made it somewhat easier for Sanderman J to depict her as a 
‘smothering mother,’ underlying his critique is a suggestion that over-protected and 
controlled children may be a possible by-product of permitting women to parent 
without male interference. 
 
 
The final case involving an SMC is the Quebec Court of Appeal decision of 
L.B. & E.B. c. G.N.68 N, a single woman, decided to have a child on her own. N and 
G were engaged in a regular sexual relationship, but were not a couple and never 
resided together. N asked G if he would help her conceive a child. G already had two 
children and stated he did not want any additional financial responsibility. N told 
him she did not expect any financial support. G agreed to assist and N conceived. N 
and G continued their sexual relationship up until the child’s birth in 2003. It was 
G’s assertion that N had said she would put him on the birth certificate. After the 
birth of the child (L) he asked to see the birth certificate. N eventually showed him 
one which included his name, but G later learned it was a fake. As part of the 
                                                
63 C.C, supra note 59 at para 9.  
64 Caufield, supra note 58 at para 19. 
65 Ibid at para 17. 
66 Ibid at para 7. 
67 Ibid at paras 7 & 9. 
68 L.B. & E.B. c G.N., 2011 QCCS 348 [L.B]. 
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arrangement, N gave G several financial installments totaling $1400. G testified at 
various times that the payments constituted a loan, a gift, and compensation for the 
first pregnancy (a miscarriage), but not the second.69  
 
 
After L’s birth, G visited sporadically, spending time with the little girl only 
in her mother’s presence. N looked after all of L’s needs and G knew little of her 
daily activities. He admitted at trial that he played no role in guiding or supervising 
her education, could not identify any of the daycares or schools she had attended, and 
that he had played no role in and knew nothing of L’s considerable medical care 
while she was an infant. L called G by his first name, until he started insisting she 
address him as “daddy.” When L was two, N was diagnosed with cancer. N 
underwent a year of treatment, but eventually passed away. G only became aware of 
N’s illness when he was notified of her death by N’s parents. In her will, N named 
her mother (E.B.) as L’s tutor.70 L was three and a half years old and in the care of 
her grandparents when G made an application for filiation, as well as a modification 
of L’s surname to include his own. The Quebec Supreme Court granted the action in 
filiation and denied the name change. The decision was upheld by the Quebec Court 
of Appeal,71 and leave to the Supreme Court of Canada was denied.72  
 
 
Quebec’s filiation legislation is unique in that it permits the transfer of 
genetic material for the purpose of a third-party parental project to take place by way 
of sexual intercourse. Article 538.2, which establishes that a contribution of genetic 
material for the purpose of a parental project does not create a bond of filiation 
between the contributor and the child born of the parental project, goes on to state 
that: 
 
[I]f the genetic material is provided by way of sexual intercourse, a bond 
of filiation may be established, in the year following the birth, between the 
contributor and the child.73  
 
Thus, article 538.2 establishes that a parental project can exist even where 
conception occurs via sexual intercourse. When that is the case, the donor has the 
opportunity to establish filiation within the first year of a child’s life, which the 
donor in L.B. failed to do. However, if the court concludes that there is no parental 
project, article 538.2 become irrelevant and the situation falls under the rules 
governing filiation by blood. 
 
 
                                                
69 Ibid at para 14.  
70 A “tutor” is the equivalent of a common law guardian. 
71 L.B, supra note 68. 
72 L.B. & E.B. c G.N., 2011 QCCA 1180 [L.B appeal]. 
73 Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1992, c 64, art 538.2. 
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The trial judge in L.B. held that for a parental project to exist, it is necessary 
for the person who provides the genetic material to voluntarily agree to limit his or 
her role and to avoid the legal consequences of filiation that would normally follow. 
It was concluded at trial that the grandparents failed to demonstrate that G had 
agreed to limit his role in this way. On appeal, the grandparents’ challenged this 
factual finding, arguing that the trial judge made overriding errors in retaining G’s 
contradictory testimony, made undue inferences from the relationship N allowed G 
and L to have, and failed to take into account the fact G never agreed to assume 
financial care of L.  
 
 
While the Court of Appeal accepted it would be erroneous to assume there 
was no parental project involving assisted reproduction simply because the donor 
had a certain relationship with the child, it concluded there was not sufficient 
evidence to support the assertion that G had intended to just be a donor. Relying 
almost entirely on G’s testimony, much of which the court stated “was neutral, not 
favouring one story or the other,” it concluded there was no evidence that N told G 
his role would be limited to that of a sperm donor. The facts that were said to support 
this conclusion were that G attended N’s first ultrasound, asked to appear on L’s 
birth certificate, announced to his family that he was going to become a father, and 
visited somewhat regularly. In addition, N invited G to meet the baby two days after 
the birth and N and G continued to have sexual relations until the birth of the child. 
The court acknowledged that the payment by N of $1400 to G was “troublesome” 
and that his evidence with regard to the payment was “contradictory,” but ultimately 
chose to overlook it. The Court of Appeal also refused to draw any adverse 
conclusion based on G’s lack of financial contribution, stating filiation is established 
by law and does not follow the desire of a parent to assume the consequences that 
follow upon such filiation, such as the obligation to provide financial support.  
 
 
There are, however, a number of factual issues that the court chose to 
simply ignore. For example, G knew little of L’s life and exaggerated his 
involvement in it,74 and failed to call a single witness, friend or family, to 
substantiate his evidence. The grandparents argued this last factor – G’s failure to 
call any witnesses after initially indicating that he would – created a situation where 
he was the sole provider of evidence with regard to his relationship with L and N, 
and justified an inference that either he never represented himself to his family and 
friends as L’s father or that their testimony would have been detrimental to his 
position. The grandparents also relied on the fact that G knew almost nothing of L’s 
life as evidence of his peripheral role. He never spent any time alone with L, never 
attended any of her medical appointments or functions at daycare, and was not 
surprised or concerned that N never included him in decisions involving L’s care and 
                                                
74 For example, he originally testified that he assembled L’s crib, but when another witness testified that 
she had built the crib he later admitted he merely adjusted a leg. 
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education. He did not know that L was a difficult, colicky baby, when she began 
daycare or which daycare she attended, and remained unaware of the fact that L’s 
mother had become seriously ill over a year prior to her death, had a mastectomy, 
and had undergone aggressive chemotherapy and radiation treatment. Thus, while the 
court stated that it should not presume the lack of a parental project simply because 
G had contact with L, it ignored the fact that the relationship which did exist was 
minimal and certainly not one characterized by the closeness of a parent. While some 
kind of “involved known donor” status may have assisted in this case, the donor’s 
involvement was so minimal that it is hard to know whether he would have even met 
such a standard. 
 
 
The existing case law suggests that when judges have some discretion, they 
prefer to protect biological relationships over pre-conception intention and existing 
family relationships. This conclusion is perplexing for a number of reasons. First, as 
Campbell has argued, third party gametes are used because the couple or individual 
cannot conceive a child without assistance and not because of any intention on the 
part of the couple or individual to co-parent with the gamete provider.75 In fact, the 
intention of the parties is usually the complete opposite. Even when a known donor 
is used and some involvement is envisaged, there is rarely an intention to parent with 
the donor.76 Thus, to identify biology as the basis for parentage seems to ignore the 
foundational purpose of assisted conception: to create a child for the intended 
parent(s) with the assistance of a third party gamete provider. The emphasis on 
biology in this context is particularly damaging to lesbian couples who must always 
rely on third party gametes for reproduction.  
 
 
Second, the favouring of biology over pre-conception intention and the 
integrity of women-led families is contrary to legislative trends both in Canada and 
elsewhere.77 The five provinces that have legislation addressing parentage in 
situations of assisted conception establish from the outset that donors are not, by 
virtue of their donations, legal parents. A typical example is section 24 of British 
Columbia’s new Family Law Act provides that if a child is born as a result of assisted 
reproduction (defined as “a method of conceiving a child other than by sexual 
intercourse”), a donor is not, by reason only of the donation, the child’s parent, and 
may not be declared by a court, by reason only of the donation, to be the child’s 
parent. Rather, he can only be declared a parent if it is determined under the Family 
                                                
75 Campbell, supra note 8 at 259. 
76 Kelly, supra note 4 at 101-108. 
77 For an excellent international example, see the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) from 
Victoria, Australia, which expressly protects the parentage of both lesbian couples and SMCs. The U.K.’s 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, c 22, is a second, albeit flawed, example of the 
international trend towards recognizing women-led families. 
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Law Act that he is one. A donor who wants to be a legal parent therefore must make 
more than a purely biological argument to support a parentage application. Provincial 
legislation also includes parenting presumptions that operate at the time of a child’s 
birth to protect the pre-conception intention of a couple to extend legal parentage to 
the birth mother’s partner, whether male or female. For example, section 27 of B.C.’s 
Family Law Act states that when a child is conceived using assisted reproduction, the 
parents of the child are the child’s birth mother, and the person married to, or in a 
marriage-like relationship with the birth mother (whether male or female), unless 
there is proof that that person, before conception, either did not consent to be the 
child’s parent or withdrew consent. Quebec, Alberta, Manitoba and P.E.I. have 
provisions similar to those in the Family Law Act, pointing to a clear statutory trend 
in favour of intention-based parentage rules amongst the provinces that have 
legislated in this area. 
 
 
Finally, decisions as to custody and access in these cases suggest an 
interpretation of the best interests of the child test that ignores the child’s interest in 
family stability and security, typically key considerations when courts are making 
access determinations. Yet, the judges in the cases described above prefer to 
prioritize the hypothetical benefit a child might gain from having a relationship with 
his or her biological father over the existing benefit of a stable and secure family. 
The effect of such a preference is that the child goes from living in a stable intact 
family, to moving between two homes, often with accompanying antagonism. At the 
same time, the child’s legal relationship with his or her non-biological parent 
virtually vanishes, replaced by the parentage of the donor. 
 
 
2. REFORMING PROVINCIAL PARENTAGE LAWS 
 
While the cases discussed above demonstrate that judicial interpretation of seemingly 
progressive statutory provisions can undermine their benefits for women-led 
families, statutory presumptions designed to curtail judicial discretion are 
nonetheless an appropriate starting point. In circumstances where the pre-conception 
intention is clear, statutory presumptions make it more difficult for judges to exercise 
discretion in a way that favours biological relationships over other types of 
relationships. As noted above, five provinces already have legislation addressing 
parentage in instances of assisted reproduction. British Columbia’s new Family Law 
Act, which came into force in March 2013 and expressly recognizes women-led 
families, serves as a high water mark in the field. 
 
 
The key feature of each of the provincial statutes is an intention-based 
system of assigning legal parentage that diminishes the significance of biological 
connection. This is typically achieved via two statutory presumptions. First, 
individuals who donate gametes for the purpose of assisted reproduction are not legal 
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parents by virtue of the donation.78 Such a provision prevents a judge from declaring 
a donor a parent solely on the basis that the donor is the child’s biological father and, 
in the event that a donor is declared a father, requires the judge to provide some 
justification, beyond biology, for the decision. The second key feature present in all 
of the statutes is the inclusion of a parentage presumption that locates parenthood 
with the birth mother and her partner, whether male or female, provided that the 
partner has consented to the conception.79 These provisions reinforce that, in the 
context of assisted conception, parentage is grounded in pre-conception intention, not 
biology. Any reform in this area must include these two elements as a matter of basic 
protection for women-led families. Beyond these basics, however, there are a number 
of other provisions found within the existing legislation that would greatly assist 
lesbian and SMC families. 
 
 
The Quebec and B.C. legislation include a number of provisions that set 
them apart from other statutes in this area, providing better protection to women-led 
families. The first is that each appears to – at least implicitly – envisage a single 
parent family created via assisted reproduction. As noted above, the Quebec law 
assigns “filiation” to individuals engaged in a “parental project”. A parental project 
involving assisted procreation “exists from the moment a person alone decides or 
spouses by mutual consent decide” to have a child using third party gametes.80 Thus, 
a parental project can be a project of a sole individual, such as an SMC. When read 
alongside article 538.2 – “the contribution of genetic material for the purposes of a 
third-party parental project does not create any bond of filiation between the 
contributor and the child born of the parental project” – the Quebec legislation seems 
to suggest that a woman can become a child’s sole legal parent. British Columbia’s 
new legislation also appears to recognize the possibility of a single mother family, 
though it is less clear than the Quebec legislation. The B.C. Act refers on a number of 
occasions, including within the definitions section, to “intended parents” as well as 
an “intended parent,” suggesting that there can be a single intended parent. 
Additional references to an “intended parent” occur in the surrogacy provisions, 
suggesting surrogacy is the area where a single intended parent is anticipated (eg, a 
single gay man). However, there is no reason to presume that a sole intended parent 
could not also be a single woman who conceives via donor insemination. In fact, it 
would be an odd conclusion if the prospect of a single intended parent was imagined 
only in the case of surrogacy.  
 
 
As noted earlier, a second element of the Quebec legislation that sets it apart 
from other statutes in this field is that the transfer of genetic material for the purpose 
                                                
78 Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64, art 538.2; Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 24(1). Alberta’s 
legislation does not have an explicit statement that the donor is not a legal parent, though it is implied in 
other provisions that positively identify the legal parents of a child conceived via assisted reproduction. 
79 Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 27; Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 8.1(5); Civil Code of 
Quebec, SQ 1991, c. 64, art 538.3. 
80 Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64, art 538. 
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of a parental project may take place by way of sexual intercourse.81 Such an 
approach is expressly rejected in the B.C., P.E.I., Manitoba, and Alberta statutes. It 
should be noted, however, that even in Quebec a parental project that involves the 
transfer of gametes via intercourse is not treated identically to conception via assisted 
reproduction. In the case of the former, the donor has the opportunity to establish 
filiation within the first year of a child’s life, while the latter bars a claim of filiation 
entirely. Given that conception via intercourse is a reasonably common feature of 
SMC cases, and occasionally present in lesbian couple cases, defining “assisted 
conception” to include conception via intercourse seems essential. As with 
conception via donor insemination or IVF, the main issue for the court should be to 
determine the parties’ pre-conception intention. It would therefore be beneficial for 
legislation to encourage pre-conception written agreements, as the B.C. statute does 
in relation to “multiple parent” families, discussed below. 
 
 
British Columbia’s statute also includes a significant feature that sets it 
apart from other legislation in this area: it permits a child to have three legal parents, 
provided that there is a pre-conception written agreement to that effect.82 This option 
is only available when conception occurs via assisted reproduction and was clearly 
designed to meet the needs of lesbian couples who wish to co-parent with a donor, or 
couples (same-sex or opposite-sex) who want to include a surrogate or egg donor 
within their legal family. For a child to have three legal parents, a number of 
requirements must be fulfilled. Section 30 states that a child can have three legal 
parents if a written agreement is made, prior to conception, between (i) an intended 
parent or the intended parents and a potential birth mother who agrees to be a parent 
together with the intended or intended parents (a surrogacy arrangement); or (ii) the 
potential birth mother, a person who is married to or in a marriage-like relationship 
with the potential birth mother, and a donor who agrees to be a parent together with 
the potential birth mother and her partner (a known donor scenario). Section 30 
therefore has the potential to meet the needs of families in circumstances similar to 
the parties in A.A. v B.B.83 It may also help bolster the presumption that a donor is 
not a legal parent. If a donor wishes to assert parentage, he needs to meet the 
requirements stipulated under section 30. Failing to do so, he must accept that a 
donor is not a legal parent simply by virtue of donating.  
 
 
The existing provincial laws provide an excellent starting point for future 
legislation designed to protect the autonomy and stability of women-led families. 
Three essential elements can be drawn from them. First, any legislation in this area 
must protect both lesbian couples and single women, by locating parentage within 
                                                
81 Ibid. at art. 538.2. 
82 Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c. 25, s. 30. 
83 A.A, supra note 1. 
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the intended family and by severing any legal link between the gamete donor and 
child. Single women are often ignored when reform in this area occurs, so particular 
attention must be paid to expressly including them within the legislative framework. 
Given the frequency with which prospective SMCs (and sometimes lesbian women) 
conceive via intercourse, though they do not intend to co-parent with the donor, 
legislation should also clarify that, in situations where a pre-conception agreement 
exists, conception via intercourse does not negate the intention of the lesbian couple 
or single woman to parent independently of the donor. Finally, in the small number 
of instances where women intend to co-parent with donors, legislation should permit 
a child to have more than two legal parents. Making this option available provides 
sufficient flexibility to meet the needs of the variety of lesbian family configurations 
that exist. However, by requiring a written agreement to this affect, it reinforces that 
such an arrangement is an exception to the general rule that a donor is not a legal 
parent.  
 
 
What is not included in any of the existing statutory regimes is a legal identity 
designed to respond to the circumstances of the “involved known donor.” While I 
have expressed caution above in relation to such a category, at least some of the 
concerns expressed by lesbian parents may be overcome by creating a legal status 
that recognizes the role some known donors play in children’s lives, without 
interfering with the parentage of the non-biological mother. Whether referred to as a 
“non-parental adult caregiver” as Kelly suggests,84 or simply as “an involved known 
donor,” the existence of such a category may assist lesbian women and SMCs who 
consider donor involvement to be beneficial to their child, but do not intend to co-
parent with the donor. 
 
 
LAW REFORM IN THE SHADOW OF THE CHARTER 
 
While legislation similar to that which exists in B.C., Alberta, Quebec, Manitoba and 
P.E.I. is likely to rectify many of the existing concerns, given the slow pace of 
statutory change and the possibility legislation will not always be interpreted in the 
best light for women-led families, it is also important to consider how to shift 
judicial thinking in these cases. Though judges sometimes refer to the best interests 
of the child, decision-making with regard to legal parentage is not subject to a best 
interests analysis. If a donor is declared a legal parent then the judge must determine 
whether custody or access is in the child’s best interests. Judges have universally 
found in favour of the donor at this point. It is my recommendation that, in addition 
to the introduction of statutory provisions addressing parentage in the context of 
assisted reproduction, judges should be encouraged to interpret the best interests of 
the child test in a manner that is consistent with children’s section 15 equality rights 
under Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.85  
                                                
84 Kelly, supra note 2 at 155. 
85 Charter, supra note 9. 
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While the judges making the decisions discussed above presumably based 
their conclusions on what they believed was in the best interests of the children 
involved, their preference for maximizing the relationship between children and their 
biological fathers over the preservation of the existing relationships between non-
biological mothers and their children and the stability of the intact family, suggests 
they view women-led families as incomplete. The children in each of the cases 
discussed above lived in stable, healthy homes with loving parents, and there was no 
indication that their well-being was in any way compromised by not having access to 
their biological father. Yet, each of the judges concluded that the status quo did not 
meet the child’s best interests, that there was something deficient about these 
families that meant an additional figure – a “father” – needed to be involved. This 
conclusion is difficult to justify for three reasons. As noted above, family security 
and stability is in a child’s best interests, and while this needs to be balanced with 
other aspects of the best interests test, these cases appear to completely ignore it as 
an element of the analysis.86 Second, research indicates that children raised by two 
lesbian mothers have psychological and educational outcomes equal to, if not better 
than, children raised by heterosexual parents.87 In other words, being raised only by a 
lesbian couple does not appear to compromise in any way the best interests of 
children. There is thus no evidence-based reason to insert fathers into lesbian 
families. Finally, the insistence that children’s best interests require that they have an 
involved “father” is a particularly ironic conclusion in a country where lesbian 
couples can marry. While I do not believe that married couples are any more 
committed to their children than unmarried couples, it is odd that in a country where 
stability for children was used to justify the extension of marriage rights to same-sex 
couples,88 two women who have a child within a marriage cannot rely on the state to 
recognize them as the legal parents of that child. 
 
 
The best interests of the child test – the sole consideration for judges 
making custody and access determinations – typically involves a balancing of a 
variety of statutory factors and a consideration of the particular circumstances of the 
child in question. It is necessarily subjective, as it is designed to respond to the needs 
                                                
86 An extremely poignant article written by an American adult who was a child-participant in a dispute 
between her lesbian mothers and her sister’s donor, highlights exactly how upsetting a donor’s attack on 
the child’s sense of family can be. See Cade Russo-Young, “My House on Stilts” in Susan Goldberg & 
Chloe Brushwood Rose (eds.), And Baby Makes More: Known Donors, Queer Parents, and Our 
Unexpected Families (London, ON: Insomniac Press, 2009) 208.  
87 Loes van Gelderen, Henny Bos, Nanette Gartrell, Jo Hermanns, Ellen Perrin, “Quality of Life of 
Adolescents Raised from Birth by Lesbian Mothers: The US National Longitudinal Family Study” (2012) 
33(1) Journal of Developmental & Behavioral Pediatrics 1. 
88 For a discussion of the way in which rhetoric around the importance of marriage to children played an 
important role in the same-sex marriage debate in Canada see Kelly, supra note 12 at 54-56. 
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of the individual child.89 This subjectivity can pose significant problems for women-
led families. The existing case law suggests that when judges are faced with an 
access dispute involving a lesbian or SMC family, they rarely apply the best interests 
test in a manner that acknowledges or respects the completeness of the child’s 
functional family.90 Rather, judges tend to fall back on hetero-normativity, 
refashioning the existing family in a manner which undermines the integrity of the 
relationships within it and imposes new relationships based on the desire for an 
opposite-sex parental structure. The effect of this on children is unequal treatment: 
children conceived via assisted reproduction and raised within women-led families 
do not enjoy the same level of family security and stability as children similarly 
conceived and raised within heterosexual families.  
 
 
One way in which to address the inequality experienced by children raised 
in women-led families is to argue that the best interests of the child test should be 
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with children’s section 15 equality rights. In 
particular, children conceived via assisted reproduction and raised within women-led 
families should not be discriminated against on the basis of their mode of conception 
and/or the family structure into which they are born. In practice, this would mean 
that the rules of legal parentage for children born into lesbian and SMC families be 
clearly established (preferably by way of legislative presumption, as discussed 
above) and, in the absence of such legislation, the importance of the child’s family 
integrity be acknowledged when making custody and access determinations under 
the best interests test.  
 
 
While family law is private litigation and thus not subject to direct Charter 
scrutiny,91 the Charter has nonetheless had significant impact on family law. First, 
the introduction of the Charter forced governments to review and amend legislation 
to ensure existing statutory provisions complied.92 Second, direct constitutional 
                                                
89 While necessarily subjective, the best interests test has also been criticized for its indeterminacy. The 
first critique was mounted in 1975 by Robert Mnookin and many others have followed. Robert M. 
Mnookin, “Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy” (1975) 39 Law 
& Contemporary Problems 226; Katherine Bartlett, “Preference, Presumption, Predisposition, and 
Common Sense: From Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American Law Institute's Family Dissolution 
Project” (2002) 36(1) Family Law Quarterly 11 at 13-17; Martha Fineman, “Dominant Discourse, 
Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking” (1988) 101 Harvard Law 
Review 727.  
90 As Jenni Millbank explains, functional family claims “rest on a performative aspect, that is, the parties 
are granted rights because of what they do in relation to one another, not because of the status of who they 
are or what manner of legal formality they have undertaken.” Millbank has argued that while functional 
family claims have been a successful tool for gaining rights from the State for lesbian and gay families, 
the model has faltered in the context of lesbian and gay intra-family disputes. The cases discussed above 
support this thesis. Millbank, supra note 2 at 150. 
91 Dolphin Delivery v R.W.D.S.U., [1986] 2 SCR 573. 
92 The most obvious effect of this first round of review was the introduction of gender-neutral language 
into family law legislation, enabling both men and women to apply for child support and spousal support.  
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challenges to statutory provisions have been brought in the courts on the basis that 
the laws violate Charter guarantees such as sex equality (section 15) or the right to 
“life, liberty and security of the person” (section 7).93 As a result, family law statutes 
are now gender neutral, treating female and male spouses identically in relation to 
spousal support, child support, matrimonial property division, and child custody. The 
third way in which the Charter has influenced family law is the most controversial. 
The Charter has been invoked both by scholars and litigants to argue that, even in the 
absence of state action, judges must take into account the fundamental values 
enshrined in the Charter.94 For family law, and the best interest of the child test in 
particular, this third application of the Charter has significant transformative 
potential. As Boyd explains,  
 
[The application of Charter values to family law] is important because 
many areas of family law involve the exercise of judicial discretion 
regarding concepts that originated in common law. Indeed, family law is a 
field that arguably involves more indeterminative normative concepts and 
standards than many areas of law that are embodied in statutes.95  
 
In no area of family law is Boyd’s argument better demonstrated than in regard to the 
best interests of the child test. Due to its inherent indeterminacy, the best interests 
test is particularly vulnerable to judicial biases associated with gender, race, class, 
sexual orientation, and disability.96 However, if tempered by Charter values, 
particularly the constitutional commitment to equality, assessments of the best 
interests of the child are less likely to incorporate normative assumptions which are 
damaging to children raised in women-led families. 
 
 
References to Charter values by the Supreme Court of Canada are now 
common in family law disputes, particularly with regard to economic matters. In the 
spousal support area, for example, the Supreme Court in Moge v Moge97 relied on the 
Charter’s guarantee of substantive equality to shift the analysis from a simplistic 
                                                
93 These court challenges produced changes in the areas of adoption (eg, Re K (1995), 15 RFL (4th) 129 
(ONSC)), spousal support for members of same-sex couples (M v H [1996] 132 DLR (4th) 538 (ONSC)), 
birth registration (see, Gill v Murray, supra note 1; M.D.R. v Ontario (Deputy Registrar General), supra 
note 1) and civil marriage (eg, EGALE Canada Inc. v. A-G of Canada, 2001 BCSC 1365;  Halpern v 
Canada (A-G) (2002), 60 OR (3d) 321). 
94 Nicholas Bala, The Charter of Rights and Family Law in Canada:  A New Era (2000) 18 Canadian 
Family Law Quarterly 373 at 423; Susan B Boyd, “The Impact of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on 
Canadian Family Law (2000) 17 Canadian Journal of Family Law 293 at 295. 
95 Boyd, ibid. at 295. 
96 Marlee Kline, “Child Welfare Law, ‘Best Interests of the Child’ Ideology, and First Nations” (1992) 30 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 375; I. Thery, “‘The Interest of the Child’ and the Regulation of the Post-
Divorce Family” (1986) 14 International Journal of Society and the Law 341 at 345. 
97 Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813. 
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approach to spousal support that treated spouses as equals at marriage breakdown, 
regardless of whether they were actually equally positioned, to a more nuanced 
approach that acknowledged the reality of women’s economic inequality when 
relationships break down. Following Moge, judges have continued to rely on 
substantive equality to introduce social context evidence that addresses the 
feminization of poverty and the unequal economic effects for men and women 
arising out of marriage or marriage-like relationships. For example, in Willick v 
Willick, another spousal support decision, L’Heureux-Dube J (McLachlin and 
Gonthier JJ concurring) stated that: 
 
Given the profound economic impact on the parties that may follow from 
differing interpretations of the Divorce Act’s support provisions, it follows 
that in the present case, as it did in Moge, this Court should seek to assure 
itself that its preferred interpretation is consistent with Charter values of 
substantive equality rather than with the values of formal equality.98 
 
Given the decisions in Moge, Willick, and other similar cases, it can be concluded 
that the guarantee of substantive equality found in section 15 of the Charter, while 
not applying directly to private family law matters, has facilitated the introduction of 
social context analysis in family law determinations, particularly in relation to 
economic issues.  
 
 
The desirability of incorporating Charter values into child custody law 
nonetheless remains controversial. As Boyd argues, because of the primacy of the 
best interests of the child test in custody and access law, rights discourse is rendered 
problematic.99 However, the judicial focus thus far has been on the problematic 
nature of incorporating the equality rights of parents into custody and access 
decision-making, something that courts have quite firmly rejected.100 By contrast, it 
is my argument that the best interests of the child test should incorporate the 
substantial equality rights of children.  
 
 
The relationship between the Charter and the best interests of the child test 
was first addressed in 1993 in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Young v 
Young.101 Young involved the religious freedom of a non-custodial father who, when 
exercising access with his children, participated in religious practices the custodial 
parent opposed. One of the issues to be determined by the Supreme Court was 
                                                
98 Willick v Willick, [1994] 3 SCR 670 at para 52. 
99 Boyd, supra note 94 at 305. 
100 The refusal of judges to consider the rights of parents in custody and access decision-making is based 
on the primacy of the best of the child test. The best interests test requires that the sole focus be on the 
child and not on what might be the competing interests of a parent. It would therefore be difficult to 
sustain an argument that the best interests test should be interpreted in light of women’s substantive 
equality rights. 
101 Young v Young (1993) 108 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC) [Young]. 
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whether the Charter applied to child custody law and, in particular, to the best 
interests of the child test. While all of the judges in Young agreed that the legislative 
test for determining the best interests of the child was subject to Charter scrutiny, 
they did not conclude on the issue of whether the Charter applied to court orders 
made under the best interests test. Three members of the Court declined to 
specifically rule on the application of the Charter, arguing that if the best interests of 
the child test was interpreted properly orders arising out of the interpretation could 
not violate the Charter.102 The remaining four judges found that once the best 
interests test had been found to accord with Charter values, the Charter has no direct 
application to private disputes between parents, or to court orders regarding custody 
and access matters.103 The judges differed, however, on the manner and extent to 
which the Charter should affect the interpretation of the test. Of the various judges 
who favoured the incorporation of Charter values, Sopinka J stated it most 
succinctly: “while the ultimate determination in deciding issues of custody and 
access is ‘the best interests of the child test,’ it must be reconciled with the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”104  
 
 
There is thus some significant precedent for interpreting the best interests 
test in a manner that is consistent with Charter values. Though concern about using 
Charter values to promote parental rights is likely to continue, incorporating within 
the best interests test the substantive equality rights of children appears far less 
controversial. In fact, provincial governments introducing legislation establishing 
parentage within women-led families in the context of assisted reproduction have 
stated that the very purpose of the new provisions is to protect the equality rights of 
children. For example, the explanatory materials produced by the B.C. Ministry of 
Justice for the new Family Law Act stated that the new legislative regime, which 
recognizes the parentage of both lesbian couples and SMCs, “treats children equally, 
regardless of the circumstances surrounding their birth, protects children’s best 
interests and promotes stable family relationships.”105 Material accompanying 
Canada’s Uniform Child Status Act, model legislation drafted by the Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada in 2010 which includes presumptions of parentage based on 
pre-conception intention, similarly states “[the presumptions] provide stability for 
the child and equal treatment for children regardless of the method of their 
conception.”106 Given the stated desire amongst some provincial legislators to 
redress inequality between children based on mode of conception and/or family type, 
                                                
102 Justices McLachlin, Cory and Iacobucci. 
103 Justices L’Heureux-Dube, La Forest, Gonthier and Sopinka. 
104 Young, supra note 101 at para 263. 
105 B.C. Ministry of Justice, “The Family Law Act Explained” (2012). Available at: 
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/legislation/family-law/pdf/part3.pdf> 
106 Uniform Child Status Act (2010), Uniform Law Conference of Canada. Available at: 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/> 
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it should not be particularly controversial to address these same inequalities via 
judicial decision-making. 
 
 
Consideration of the equality interests of children in parentage and access 
disputes between lesbian couples or SMCs and their donors will likely expose, and 
hopefully rectify, the differential treatment currently occurring in the courts. The 
tendency of judges to award donors access or even joint custody, whatever the cost 
to the child’s stability within his or her established family, will become difficult to 
sustain when viewed through the lens of children’s equality. Courts will be forced to 
explicitly justify a disruption to the child’s identity and security, indicating why such 
children should be treated differently from those conceived via donor insemination 
and raised in heterosexual families. While courts may still come to the conclusion 
that a donor is entitled to custody or access, it will hopefully become more difficult 
to minimize a child’s interest in family stability.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Lesbian couples, single women, and the children they raise, are entitled to the same 
level of family security and autonomy as two-parent heterosexual families. This 
means lesbian mothers and SMCs should be able to parent independently from a 
male donor, if that is their pre-conception intention. However, due to the lack of 
legislative protection in most Canadian provinces, as well as judicial reluctance to 
acknowledge the completeness of a family without a father, women-led families with 
known donors exist in a state of legal insecurity. Legislative reform which assigns 
parentage on the basis of pre-conception intention, and is available to both lesbian 
couples and single women, will hopefully provide a base level of security for 
women-led families. In addition, a revisiting of the best interests of the child test in 
light of Charter values will go some way towards recognizing the equality rights of 
children born into women-led families. While judicial discretion will always remain 
a key component of family law, it is hoped that these reforms will go some way 
towards achieving equality for women-led families and the children raised within 
them. 
